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IDENTIFYING THE RAPE VICTIM: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CLASH BETWEEN
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As long as its reports are accurate1 , the media has a constitutional privilege to report information of public record.2 The press
has utilized this source-based privilege to reveal the names of rape
victims that are found in official records.3 Notwithstanding the acknowledged right of a free and vigorous press, it is of questionable
propriety for the media to disclose the identity of a sexual assault
victim. 4 Publication of a rape victim's name severely invades the

personal privacy interests of the victim and exposes the victim to a
variety of social and psychological problems.5 Therefore, the rape
1. The constitutional privilege to publish documented facts extends to the
press where its judicial reports are true, but not when its judicial reports are
false. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976) (press can be liable for
defamation if it relied on judicial records which were inaccurate).
2. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (publication of
accurate reports of judicial proceedings is a privilege under the first amendment against a cause of action for invasion of privacy). See Montesano v.
Donrey Media Group, 99 Nev. 644, 649, 668 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1983) (liability does
not attach for disseminating facts that are already made public), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 2172 (1984); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 474, 368
P.2d 147, 148 (1962) (since court records are in the public domain, the published
identity of a child rape victim was not actionable).
3. As recently as March 23, 1984, NBC's "Today" morning news program
revealed the identity of the rape victim in the highly publicized New Bedford
gang rape case, also referred to as Big Dan's Barroom Rape Case. Allegedly,
four men assaulted the rape victim in a tavern in New Bedford while the patrons cheered. Friendly, Naming of Rape Victim Spurs Debate, N.Y. Times,
April 11, 1984, at Y14, col. 1. In another recent case, the press revealed the
names of four victims in a series of rapes in Connecticut. The Journal-Inquirer
of Manchester, Connecticut, published the victims' names which were obtained
from police records. The editor of the Journal-Inquirer claimed the disclosure
served a legitimate public interest and protected the defendant rapist from a
presumption of guilt before proven innocent. Frank, Naming Victims, Paper
Feels Heat in Rape Case, A.B.A.J., Sept., 1984, at 28.
4. There is no social value in disclosing the rape victim's identity. Any
such disclosure can detrimentally affect the rape victim's well-being for years to
come. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 331 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
5. Although psychological harm is not sufficient cause for recovery in a
privacy claim, courts sympathize with the rape victim's grevious suffering. See,
e.g., Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 331 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (publicizing the name can cause irreparable harm); Poteet v.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 177, 584 P.2d 1310, 1317 (1978) (it cannot be that important to the freedom of the press to reveal a child rape victim's
name). See also Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (bad taste for newspaper to print a photograph showing a naked
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victim's right to anonymity is not adequately protected.
Since 1963, the unwarranted publication of a rape victim's
name has constituted the basis of a tort action for invasion of per-

sonal privacy, namely, the public disclosure of a private fact.6 Beginning in 1975, however, where the reported rape is of public
record, the victim's right to anonymity is foreclosed. 7 Thus, based8
on the Supreme Court's holding in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,
the rape victim is twice assaulted: once as the victim of a sex crime
and then as the victim of a callous and impractical press.9
Although courts generally recognize the rape victim's right to
be free from humiliating and harmful publications of her name, it is
a right of privacy that often goes unprotected because of the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.10 Moreover, the
Constitution does not mandate media responsibility." In light of
the media's power to exercise its constitutional privilege to publish
facts of public record, the rape victim must frequently rely on the
discretion and judgment of those persons who decide what information to print or broadcast. 12 The rape victim should be afforded a
woman fleeing from her estranged husband), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1983);
Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 305, 543 P.2d 988, 996 (1975)
(ill-advised and in poor taste to publish a police officer's past misdeed); Roshto
v. Hebert, 439 So.2d 428, 432 (La. 1983) (a careless and insensitive press revealed
information about a man's past misdeed); Hood v. Naeter Bros. Publishing Co.,
562 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (unwise for name and address of sole
witness to a violent crime to be printed while criminals were still at large).
6. See Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502, 505 (4th
Cir. 1963) (publication of identity of sexual assault victim was an invasion of
privacy for which victim was entitled to recover). But see Hubbard v. Journal
Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 475, 368 P.2d 147, 148-49 (1962) (newspaper article
that identified plaintiff as the victim of a sexual assault by her older brother
was held to be a privileged report of information found in public records and,
thus, not an invasion of the victim's right of privacy).
7. "[T]he interests in privacy fade when the information involved already
appears on the public record." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
494-95 (1975). In Cox, a television station reported the rape victim's name and,
thus, identified Cynthia Cohn as the 17-year-old who was brutally raped and
subsequently died. Id. at 474 n.5.
8. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
9. Rape is the ultimate violation of an individual, short of homicide. Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
10. The first amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...
CONST. amend. 1.

"

U.S.

11. The virtue of the press cannot be legislated. Rawlins v. Hutchinson
Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 305, 543 P.2d 988, 996 (1975) (the insensitivity of
the press was not sufficient grounds for a privacy action even though the court
determined that the press acted in poor taste when it "dredged" up a police
officer's past misdeed).
12. The press is not liable for its insensitivity or carelessness when the publication is truthful and accurate. Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So.2d 428, 431-32 (La.
1983) (in dictum, the court speculated that malice can give rise to liability even
if the report is accurate). Accord Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W. 2d 251, 273
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (crime victim prevailed on a negligence theory against
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premium of protection because of the adverse impact that ensues
when her identity is disclosed. 13 It is evident that there is a need to
reconcile the constitutional privilege afforded the press with the
privacy rights afforded the rape victim.
This comment seeks to determine whether courts can constitutionally shield the rape victim's identity. 14 First, this comment examines the competing interests involved in the publication of a rape
victim's identity. In an attempt to balance these competing interests, this comment discusses the rape victim's right of personal privacy, 15 the press' fundamental right to publish what is
newsworthy, 16 and the states' dual interests in prosecuting rapists
and shielding the rape victim from public scrutiny. 17 This comment
subsequently analyzes the United States Supreme Court decision
that created the presumption that publicly documented information
is newsworthy.' 8 An analysis of this presumption gives rise to the
newspaper for its accurate report of victim's name that was of public record),
cert. denied sub nom. Tribune Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
13. See infra note 151.
14. It was held in Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502,
504 (4th Cir. 1963), that "identity" could be synonymous with "name" for purposes of a statute that prohibited publication of a rape victim's name. Although
the rape victims in Nappier were not identified by name, the picture of the
victims' vehicle, in effect, divulged the names of the rape victims. Id. at 504.
For further discussion on what constitutes identity, see Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 191, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428-32 (1984) (photograph depicting rear and side of two women, but not their faces, was sufficient to create
a fact question for jury determination as to identification because it revealed
recognizable physical characteristics).
15. One Florida court clearly recognized circumstances that give rise to the
right of the rape victim to remain anonymous:
Prior to this trial, appellant was simply an ordinary citizen; she lacked fame
and prominence... but she had the unhappy circumstance of becoming a
victim of a crime. The publication added little or nothing to the sordid and
unhappy story; yet, that brief little-or-nothing addition may well affect appellant's well-being for years to come.
Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
16. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
17. Rape victims are more likely to come forward and testify if there is no
fear of public scrutiny. Additionally, the quality of a victim's testimony is enhanced if the press is not present. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457
U.S. 596, 618-20 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (press should not be present
while child rape victim testifies). The majority in Globe held that state interests
in encouraging minor victims of rape to report crimes were insufficient to overcome a first amendment attack. Id. at 610. Prior to Globe, the Supreme Court
had excepted a child rape victim's testimony from exposure to the press. See
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 n.5 (1980). The Richmond Court noted that the "sensibilities of a youthful prosecution witness in a
rape trial" did not necessarily mandate constitutional considerations. Id. In
Globe, the Supreme Court changed its position. Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-05 (1982)
(the criminal system of justice cannot favor the child victim of a sex crime in
light of the first amendment).
18. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:987

last issue of whether the Supreme Court further insulated the press
from liability for printing a rape victim's name when it is publicly
documented. 19 Finally, this comment concludes with suggestions to
state legislatures and courts to advance the protection of the rape
victim's anonymity.
THE RAPE VICTIM'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Rape victims have frequently sued the press for publication of
their names under claims of invasion of privacy; specifically, for
publication of a private fact. 20 A private fact must be confidential
and of no legitimate public concern in order to be actionable. 21 If a
private fact is already known or is of public record, 22 then publication of that fact will not constitute grounds for an invasion of privacy action. In an invasion of privacy suit, the rape victim
19. The Supreme Court left undecided whether the courts can protect the
individual from disclosure of private facts other than those that are of public
record, which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and are of no
legitimate concern. Id. at 497 n.27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (h)(g) (1977). But see Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97,
104-06 (1979) (there is a constitutional privilege for disclosing accurate information from nongovernmental sources which includes information properly obtained in routine reporting practices); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845-46 (1978). In Landmark, the Supreme Court extended the press' constitutional privilege to publish accurate reports derived
from confidential proceedings. Id. at 841. Landmark involved a state statute
that prohibited disclosure of any state judge who was under investigation. Id. at
831. A newspaper published an accurate report of such a pending investigation,
naming the judge. Id. The Court held that the state could not criminally santion disclosure of truthful facts pertaining to a closed governmental proceeding.
Id. at 845.
20. The tort for invasion of privacy is divided into four branches. They are:
misappropriation of someone's name or likeness, intrusion into a person's private life, placing a person in a false light, and public disclosure of private facts.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977). The required elements
of a tortious invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts are
1) a public disclosure, 2) that the facts disclosed are private facts, and 3) that the
disclosure is offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808-09, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163
Cal. Rptr. 628, 637 (1980).
21. Often the disclosed embarrassing fact is found to be of legitimate public
concern. The media defendant, therefore, is usually successful in asserting a
newsworthiness defense against a privacy claim. Furthermore, the courts will
likely continue to be generous in permitting a newsworthiness defense whenever privacy actions implicate the first amendment. See generally Franklin, A
ConstitutionalProblem in PrivacyProtection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting,
16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 115 (1963). However, all privacy claims for publicity given
to a private fact do not necessarily bring the first amendment into play. Griffith
v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762 (N.J. Super. 1982) (rape
victim's claim against hospital did not implicate freedom of press).
22. For examples of facts held in the public domain see Stryker v. Republic
Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 193, 238 P.2d 670, 671 (1951) (member of
marine corps.); Bell v. Courier Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84,
86 (Ky. 1966) (tax delinquency); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 333-34,
95 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (1956) (dates of birth and marriage).
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commonly asserts that her name is private and not of public interest, and that disclosure would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. 23 Irrespective of the gravity of the crime of rape and
the traumatic consequences of having one's name broadcast to the
world, unconsented disclosures of rape victims' names have become
routine. 24 Since 1975, moreover, public disclosures of victims' identities have not been actionable under an invasion of privacy claim.25
The principle element of a cause of action for the publication of
a private fact is that the disclosed private fact is not of legitimate
concern to the public. Any matter which is considered a legitimate
public concern is said to be newsworthy. 26 The first amendment
guarantees that if a fact is newsworthy, it is publishable and, therefore, is not actionable as an invasion of privacy. 27 The issue is
23. The rape victim feels shame and a loss of dignity when she is raped.
United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977) (the intrusion of the rape crime is both physical and psychological and society should at-

tach the deepest sense of privacy to the intrusion), cert. denied sub nom.
Latimore v. Sielaff, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978). There are occasions when publishing a
name benefits a state interest. See Office of the Attorney General of California,
No. 83-906, slip op. (Oct. 11, 1984) (available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS, All A.G.
file) (publicizing names of absent parents who failed to pay child support).
24. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1975); Nappier
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502, 503 (4th Cir. 1963); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1761 (N.J. Super. 1982);
Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 171-72, 584 P.2d 1310, 1311-12
(1978); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 473, 368 P.2d 147, 147
(1962); Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 529, 561 P.2d 998, 999 (1977); State
v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 148-49, 33 N.W.2d 305, 306 (1948).
25. Privacy claims are generally subordinate to first amendment rights
when the defendant is the media. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496 (1975). However, in Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760
(N.J. Super. 1982), one of the defendants was a hospital. Id. at 1761. The court
in Griffith held that the rape victim's privacy claim against the hospital did not
undermine freedom of speech because the hospital records containing the victim's name were confidential pursuant to state law. Id. at 1762.
26. The court defines what newsworthy is. For example, Cox makes a fact
of public record automatically newsworthy. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). Public record means a document, book, paper, photograph, file, or sound recording recorded pursuant to state law. Note, Iowa's Freedom of Information Act"
Everything You've Always Wanted To Know About Public Records But Were
Afraid to Ask, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1167-69 (1972). Courts do not agree on
whether a police report is a public record. See, e.g., Hyde v. City of Columbia,
637 S.W.2d 251, 263 (Mo. App. 1982) (law enforcement form was confidential,
but a police arrest report was in public domain), cert denied sub nom. Tribune
Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Office of the Attorney General of
Texas, Open Records Dec., No. 339, slip op. (Dec. 31, 1982) (available July 1,
1985, on LEXIS, All A.G. file) (interprets state statute as exempting from public domain any information on police report that identified a rape victim). Contra Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 530-31, 461 P.2d 998, 1001 (1977)
(name and address of rape victim on police record open to public inspection in
accordance with Oregon law, even though law was changed subsequent to rape
victim's suit).
27. See Sipple v. Chronical Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049, 201
Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1984) (publication did not constitute disclosure of private
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whether a rape victim's name is newsworthy and, if it is not,
whether it is entitled to constitutional protection from publication. 28 The answer ultimately depends upon how a given court
'29
chooses to define and apply the term "newsworthiness.
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: NEWSWORTHINESS AND RIGHT OF
ACCESS

Newsworthiness is a vague concept which has consistently perplexed courts because it is often viewed as a factor that is too subjective and not conclusive. 30 Newsworthiness, in its broadest sense,
31
reflects an almost unqualified public right to be informed;
whereas in its strictest sense, newsworthiness imposes an emphasis
on the individual's right to privacy. The press is constitutionally
privileged to facilitate the public in its endeavor to be informed
about newsworthy affairs. 32 From this broad concept of newsworthiness, three guidelines have emerged for evaluating a legitimate
34
public interest. 33 These guidelines are the source-based privilege,
fact when newspaper revealed homosexuality of man who averted an assassination attempt on former President because plaintiff's sexual orientation was well
known and assassination attempt was of public interest).
28, A reasonable limitation on the press to protect privacy does not infringe
on first amendment rights. Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d
471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (children should have been protected from a publication
regarding a public school class for mentally retarded children because the fact
that a child has limited mental capabilities is a delicate, private matter and of no
legitimate concern to the public).
29. The idea of what is newsworthy is broader today than what was implied
by the famous Warren and Brandeis article on the emerging tort of privacy. See
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 217 (1890). At
the time of the Warren and Brandeis article, the written word was the supreme
means of communication, whereas, the present view is that the spoken work is
as pervasive. Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Iowa 1977).
30. Linder, When Names Are Not News, They're Negligence: Media Liability for PersonalInjuries Resulting From The Publicationof Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L. REV. 421, 444-45 (1984). In fact, the Supreme Court, in Cox,
may have abandoned the concept of newsworthiness. Id. at 445.
31. The Mikeljohn theory on the first amendment provides that the privilege is not the press' right to speak, but the public's right to know. Bloustein,
Privacy Tort Law And The Constitution:Is Warren And Brandeis' Tort Petty
And UnconstitutionalAs Well? 46 TEx. L. REV. 611, 624 (1968). An informed
public is essential to a thriving democracy. See Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgatheringon PrivateProperty, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1314 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Press Passes and Trespasses]. On the other hand, "to share
everything could jeopardize the sharing of anything." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 42 (1968).
32. The press provides a checking function by serving as the public's watchdog. See Press Passes and Trespasses, supra note 31, at 1320 (press is an effective medium by which to watch government abuses and, thus, is performing a
public benefit).
33. Public interest in privacy suits often involves the feature known as
lapse of time which considers the continuing interest in an "old fact." Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal.3d 529, 537-39, 483 P.2d 34, 40-41, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866,
872-73 (1971). In Briscoe, the court considered whether a fact can lose its public
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the logical nexus theory, 35 and the three-part newsworthiness
36
test.
The Supreme Court has mandated that there is a constitutional
source-based privilege of the press to publish an otherwise private
fact contained in public records. 37 The source-based privilege operates on the legal fiction that if the source containing the private fact
38
is of public record, then that fact is presumed to be newsworthy.
Newsworthiness is presumed because official records are in the
public domain and are open to inspection and copy. Based on the
first amendment, the press is free to disseminate information revealed in a public record. 39 It is argued, therefore, that the press is
status and become a private fact under the circumstances where an individual
who committed a past misdeed has since rehabilitated himself. Id. at 542, 483
P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875. Since the plaintiff had reformed and family and
friends did not know about plaintiff's criminal past until the defendant publisher revealed the past misdeed, the Briscoe court concluded there was no justification for dredging up an "old fact." Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at
876. See Office of the Attorney General in California, No. 83-906, slip op. (Oct.
11, 1984) (available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS, All A.G. file) (tortious disclosure of
old facts, depends on degree of dissemination). See also Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 188, 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983) (court relied on
Briscoe test to determine newsworthiness). Contra Beruan v. French, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 825, 829, 128 Cal. Rptr. 869, 871 (1976) (refused to follow Briscoe when a
reformed criminal ran for office in his union); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 303-04, 543 P.2d 988, 995 (1975) (stated that Cox would
dictate a different result in Briscoe because name of plaintiff in Briscoe was of
public record).
34. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975) (public
records are a source of information privileged under first amendment for purposes of publication).
35. See, e.g., Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762
(N.J. Super. 1982) (court found a logical nexus existed between the private fact
and the publication in that the rape victim's name was substantially relevant to
newspaper article depicting the rape). See also Gilbert v. Medical Economics
Co., 665 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1981) (article on medical malpractice revealed
private fact that physician had undergone psychiatric care and had a history of
marital strife; court found a logical nexus between the fact that plaintiff was
emotionally unstable and the article on medical malpractice); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (logical nexus existed in that plaintiff's private facts about her marital problems substantially related to the
content of autobiography by former brother-in-law). But see Deaton v. Delta
Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (fact that plaintiff's
children were mentally retarded was relevant to the subject matter of the article on special education classes, but constituted an invasion of privacy).
36. For examples of the application of the three-part newsworthiness test,
see Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808-09, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163 Cal. Rptr.
628, 637 (1980); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34,
43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 875 (1971); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d
118, 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983).
37. See supra note 2.
38. See text accompanying notes 86-88 for a discussion of the legal fiction
that any single public record imputes wide-spread knowledge despite the volume of information documented in our society.
39. There is a difference between trying to prevent the press from gathering the information in the first place, and preventing the dissemination of infor-
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only making known to the public what is already constructively
known. As a consequence, an item that is not necessarily of legitimate public concern is presumed newsworthy simply by virtue of its
presence in a public record.
An independent concept has emerged in some jurisdictions that
newsworthiness encompasses all facts in the public domain, including information not in public records, but which has a logical nexus
to information already in the public domain. 40 The logical nexus
theory merely requires that the private fact relate to the newsworthy content of the publication. 41 Therefore, under the logical
nexus theory, even though a private fact is not of public record, the
fact may be published if it pertains to the subject matter of a newsworthy article. 42
Finally, some jurisdictions follow a narrower view of newsworthiness and apply a three-part newsworthiness test in cases involving publication of private facts.4 3 The first part of the test addresses
44
whether there is any social value in publishing the private fact.
The second part addresses whether the nature of the intrusion into
a private life is offensive, morbid, or sensational. 45 The third part
mation that has been learned from a public record. Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Cox have expanded the constitutional right to gather information. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-10 (1982)
(right of access to hear child rape victim's testimony); Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 584-86 (1981) (Constitution does not prohibit electronic media in the
courtroom).
40. As long as there is a logical relationship between the complaining party
and the newsworthy matter, there is no invasion of privacy. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (logical nexus exists even if matter
relating to article was not newsworthy in and of itself).
41. Id. at 397.
42. Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762 (N.J.
Super. 1982) (where freedom of the press is not in conflict with the rape victim's
right of privacy, determine whether the victim's name lends credibility to the
story).
43. The three parts of the test are: 1) the social utility of the published fact,
2) the nature and extent of the intrusion into the individual's private life, and
3) the degree of publicity sought by the complaining party. Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983).
44. A fact that is not highly offensive to a reasonable person may have social value. See, e.g., Davis v. Forbes, 10 Med. L. Rptr. 1272, 1274-75 (N.D. Tex.
1984) (failure to show that publication of name, included in newsworthy list of
400 wealthiest persons in America, would disclose a fact highly offensive to a
reasonable person). See Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanonvich, Inc., 43 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974). In Johnson, a newspaper reported that a
janitor received a $10,000 reward for returning a lost bankroll, to the scorn of
his neighbors. Id. at 893, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 380. The article was reprinted in a
textbook. Id. at 883, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The court rejected the janitor's privacy claim for publicity given to private facts because the publication had social
value in that it highlighted a theme of honesty. Id. at 893, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
45. The test for determining newsworthiness is whether the intrusion is a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake. Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1975) (it is the intrusion into the private
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addresses the degree to which a complainant voluntarily entered
the public eye. 46 A court will generally apply the three-part test
once it is established that the published fact is not of public record
and, therefore, is not presumed newsworthy under a source-based
privilege. Courts, however, have never applied the three-part test
to a rape victim's claim of an invasion of privacy for publication of
her identity. Clearly, under the three-part test, the inclusion of a
rape victim's name in a publication would not be newsworthy if it
was not contained in a public record.
Additionally, to be privileged under the media's first amendment rights, the publication of a private fact must not only be newsworthy, but must be properly obtained and accurate. 4 7 Information
which is obtained from a judicial proceeding, such as a rape trial, is
properly obtained if gathered in accordance with lawful reporting
customs and practices. 48 Minimal restraints on the press' right to
gather information at a judicial.proceeding increases the likelihood
of publication of that information. 49 Lack of judicial orders restraining television coverage in the courtroom expands the media's
life that is controlling, not the manner in which the information was obtained),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 132, 188
Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983) (embarrassing fact kept from all but immediate family
and close friends); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So.2d 471, 474
(Miss. 1976) (children identified as mentally retarded did not voluntarily put
themselves in public eye and, therefore, were entitled to bring an action for
invasion of privacy). See also Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d
496, 501 (1966) (activity open to public view, like exotic dancing on a public
stage, cannot be actionable under publication given to private facts).
47. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
48. The consequences can be grave for the press where there is liability for
disseminating the truth because the decision in Cox did not make absolute that
the press cannot be civilly or criminally liable for disclosing a true fact. Id. at
490.
49. Prior restraint orders in judicial proceedings are rare when the orders
rely upon a protectable interest such as invasion of privacy. Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982). For example, it is unconstitutional to restrain the press from hearing a child rape victim testify at a judicial
proceeding despite the need to shield the child from trauma and embarrassment. Id. at 607-10. Prior restraint orders are subject to very narrow exceptions and an invasion of privacy is not among them. Here the presumption is
against restraints under the guarantee of freedom of expression. Id. at 604.
However, courts can restrain media access to evidentiary records as opposed to
transcripts of a rape victim's testimony. In re Application of KSTP Television,
504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980). In KSTP, the evidentiary record was a videotaped account of the actual assault on a rape victim. Id. at 361. The court denied release of the videotapes to the press in deferrence to the privacy rights of
the rape victim. Id. at 364. The KSTP court reasoned that release of the tapes
would only cater to the public's prurient interests and exploit the victim's right
to retain her dignity. Id.
The privacy rights of ... the unfortunate victim must be respected. As a
cooperating key witness in the prosecution, she sacrificed much of herself
and overcame a challenge to her personal dignity to respond as a good citizen to the duty to testify. She did so with candor and courage. She is enti-
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access to judicial proceedings. 50 Consequently, the ultimate degradation of a rape victim can occur through television coverage.
The media has been allowed to broadcast a rape trial on television. As a means of gathering information at a trial proceeding,
most courts have made no distinction between the presence of the
press and the presence of electronic media. 51 Televising rape trials
has made it more difficult to protect the rape victims' anonymity.
Recently, a cable news network televised a rape trial three hours a
day for three weeks. 52 Even though the victim's face was not
shown, her name was reported throughout the broadcast and was
53
subsequently rebroadcast on a national television network.
tled to the consideration and protection of the court from improper out of
court dissemination of her forced embarrassing experiences.
Id. at 364.
50. Since Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), television cameras are
permitted in the courtroom to further facilitate the public in its endeavor to be
informed and educated about newsworthy events. Id. at 565-66. Although television coverage is not constitutionally prohibited it does not mean it is constitutionally mandated. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10
(1978) (there is no first amendment right to record and broadcast the testimony
of a live witness).
51. The electronic media includes television, film, videotape, cameras, and
radio broadcast equipment. In re Post-Newsweek Stations Fla., Inc., 370 So.2d
764, 765 n.1 (Fla. 1979). In Florida, a test has been developed to measure
whether the electronic media should be allowed at a trial proceeding. It is
called the "qualitatively different" test. State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla.
1981). The qualitatively different test prohibits television coverage if there will
be a wider dissemination of information regarding the trial proceedings. Id. at
536-37. Traditional means of media coverage such as sketch artists and newspaper reporters are preferred over television coverage if televising prejudices the
trial participants in a manner "qualitatively different" from that caused by
traditional coverage. Id. at 536. According to the Green court, rape proceedings
meet the "qualitatively different" test and therefore television cameras should
be excluded. Id. at 537. But see Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co.,
436 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (permitting television cameras to
broadcast rape trial).
52. The television ratings were high and viewer mail was 5 to 1 in favor of
televising the rape trial. Kaplan, Should Rape Trials Be Televised?, N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1984, at W13, col. 1 (rape trials, like soap operas, have dramatic appeal
and are enormously entertaining). Cable News Network (CNN) broadcasted a
rape trial in Massachusetts and seeks to televise a child molestation case in California. Id. Televising a rape trial, however, perpetuates the woman as a sex
object and applauds male aggression. Rape: TV Reply (Broadcastof New Bedford Rape Trial), NAT'L, April 7, 1984, at 403.
53. See supra note 3. In the New Bedford gang rape case, the rape victim's
name was initially disclosed because the judge did not exercise the court's
power to edit the live television coverage. Friendly, Naming of Rape Victim
Spurs Debate, N.Y. Times, April 11, 1984, at Y14, col. 1 (ironically, once the
media rebroadcast the victim's name, the judge, admonished the press for its
lack of discretion).
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STATE INTERESTS

Many states have enacted rape shield statutes to restrict the
defendant's right to introduce evidence of a victim's sexual history.54 Although these statutes indicate the states' interests in protecting the rape victim from accusations of promiscuity, no
comparable statute addresses the similar problems that arise from
publishing the rape victim's identity. Given the limits on prior restraints to access of information or suppression of information already made public, state interests are not advanced by statutes
55
which do not maintain the confidentiality of a rape victim's name.
There was a time, however, when state legislatures enacted statutes
that punished the press for revealing a rape victim's identity.5 The
purpose of these statutes was to encourage the victim to report the
crime and testify at trial without fear that her right to privacy
would be lost upon disclosure of her identity.
Prior to 1975, these statutes imposed criminal sanctions for the
publication of a rape victim's name even where the name was of
public record.5 7 In 1975, however, the Supreme Court found that
those statutory proscriptions did not advance prescribed state interests because the state's prevailing interests are served when information is publicly documented. 58 The state is presumed to have
made the information available for publication and is, therefore, estopped from asserting a more compelling purpose. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court struck down those statutes that prohibited printing
the rape victim's name as violative of the press' first amendment
right to publish matters of public record.
54. See ALA. CODE § 12-21 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16 (West Supp.
1980); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-67 (1965).

55. Prior to Cox, a Wisconsin court upheld the constitutionality of a state
statute that provided for the punishment of any person who published the identity of a woman who had been sexually assaulted. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146,
161-62, 33 N.W.2d 305, 312 (1948). Even though statutes that sanctioned publication of a rape victim's name had been on the books for years, Evjue was the first
case of its kind to have led to a reported criminal prosecution. Id. at 148-49, 33
N.W.2d at 306. The statute in Evjue was first enacted in 1925. Id. at 153, 33
N.W.2d at 308. See also Franklin, A ConstitutionalProblem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibition on Reporting, 16 STAN. L. REv. 107, 122-25 (1963).
56. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81 (1962) (misdemeanor to publish sexual
assault victim's name). See Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d
502, 504 (4th Cir. 1963) (because South Carolina statute made it unlawful to
publish name of rape victim, it gave rise to tort liability for invasion of privacy).
57. See GA. CODE § 26-9901 (1975). However, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down the Georgia state
statute which made publication of a rape victim's name unlawful even if it was
contained in official court records. Id. at 496-97.
58. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975).
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Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
Two primary justifications for the right to publish a rape victim's name are the publication of public records and the publication
of newsworthy matters. On the sliding scale of competing interests
of the rape victim, the press, and the state, a balance has been
struck in favor of the press' right to identify the rape victim. In Cox
BroadcastingCorporationv. Cohn,59 the Supreme Court confronted
a privacy action for the accurate publication of a private fact: the
publication of a rape victim's name.60 The Court ruled that an accurate report of a fact taken from a judicial proceeding may be published even though it impinges upon a right of privacy. 61 Cox has
subsequently controlled four decisions favoring the press' right to
publish sexual assault victims' names. 62 An analysis of Cox and its
progeny will indicate under what circumstances, if any, courts can
shield the rape victim's identity.
In Cox, a reporter obtained the name of a 17-year-old rape victim from an official court record and disclosed the information in a
news broadcast.6 3 The rape victim's father sought recovery for the
invasion of his privacy, 64 relying upon a Georgia statute that criminally sanctioned the disclosure of a rape victim's name. 65 The
Supreme Court found that the state could not criminally sanction
the disclosure of accurate information contained in court records
which were open for public inspection. Moreover, the Cox court
59. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
60. "[T]he plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwarranted publicity
about his private affairs . . . the dissemination of which is embarrassing or
otherwise painful to an individual. . . . [T]he interests are plainly rooted in
the traditions and significant concerns of our society." Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975).
61. Id. at 493.
62. See Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328, 329
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr.
1760, 1761 (N.J. Super. 1982); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170,
171-72, 584 P.2d 1310, 1311-12 (1978); Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 537
n.10, 561 P.2d 998, 1003 n.10 (1977).
63. The telecast in part said:
Six youths went on trial today for the murder-rape of a teenaged girl. The
six Sandy Springs high school boys were charged with murder and rape in
the death of the seventeen year old Cynthia Cohn following a drinking
party... the girl was taken to a wooded area and raped. She passed out
...
and the liquids in her stomach were forced upward causing suffocation.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 60-61 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469
(1975).
64. Even though the privacy invaded was not that of the deceased rape victim, the father was held to have a valid claim for invasion of his own privacy by
reason of the disclosure of his daughter's identity. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975).
65. Id. at 474. See GA. CODE § 26-9901 (1972) (unlawful for media to print,
broadcast, or disseminate name or identity of any victim of a sexual assault,
punishable as a misdemeanor).
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found that the publication could not constitute the basis for tort lia66
bility in an invasion of privacy suit.
The Court focused on the source of the obtained information
and carved out a source-based privilege that allows the publication
of facts that are in the public domain.6 7 The Court reasoned that
the value and function of a free press, as mandated by the first
amendment, is weakened where the media cannot fully and accu68
rately report information taken from official public documents.
In creating this source-based privilege, the Cox court accorded no
deference to state interests in prosecuting rapists and shielding victims from social and psychological harm. 69 The Supreme Court did
acknowledge, however, the legitimate privacy concerns of rape victims and their families in fostering anonymity.70 The rape victim's
and her family's substantial right of privacy interests, however,
were not sufficiently compelling to overcome the first amendment
right to a free and vigorous press.
In reaching its conclusion, the Cox Court did not correctly balance the competing state and individual interests. Because the issue
was not before the Court, the Cox Court failed to address whether a
rape victim could maintain a right of privacy action when her name
66. Cox does not foreclose a privacy claim where the name was obtained in
an improper fashion or not contained in an official court document. Cox, 420
U.S. at 496. Improper methods of obtaining information will influence a court's
decision-making. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1207-08, 159 S.W.2d 291, 293
(1942) (photograph of a man hospitalized with a rare disease was taken without
consent). See Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1761 (N.J.
Super. 1982) (information about rape released to reporter by hospital staff
member while victim was hospitalized and without her consent). But see Doe v.
Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(television station used proper methods to telecast rape trial); Poteet v. Roswell
Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 172, 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1978) (because child's
name could have been obtained from court record, it was properly derived from
a public source); Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 535, 561 P.2d 998, 1002
(1977) (police officers handed police reports containing victim's name to
reporter).
67. The focus on the source-based privilege theory presumes that a rape
victim's name is newsworthy. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
495-96 (1975). Critics of Cox say that it is illogical to presume a source-based
privilege just because a reporter obtained a fact off a public record. See, e.g.,
Linder, supra note 30, at 432 (Cox does not make clear the relevance of the
source of the media's information to the protection publication of the information enjoys under the first amendment).
68. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496. The Supreme Court has tried and evaluated almost
every conceivable first amendment issue and has, in the final analysis, concluded that an uninhibited, robust, and creative press is a paramount interest in
a democratic society. See, e.g., Daily Mail Publishing Co. v. Smith, 443 U.S. 97,
106 (1979) ("Historically, we have viewed freedom of speech and of the press as
indispensable ..
").
69. The Cox Court never mentions state interests in aiding law enforcement
or protecting a citizen's right of privacy. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
70. See supra note 60.
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is derived from a police record, as opposed to an official court record.71 The Cox Court did not discuss whether disclosure of a rape
victim's name has social utility, and therefore could give rise to an
invasion of privacy action. 72 The Court found, instead, that when
the victim's name is of public record, publication is at the absolute
discretion of the press.
The Cox decision forces states to devise methods to avoid public
dociumentation of private facts. 73 Although the Court presented examples, it never explicitly defined when a fact disclosed by record is
no longer private, other than by documentation of a criminal trial
proceeding. 74 Court records, if not sealed under a court order, 75 are
public records and the subjects of these records cannot prevent publication. The rationale is that the press and the public should enjoy
71. The holding in Cox is narrow because it focuses on information contained in official court records. See supra note 66. Determining whether a police record falls within the scope of official records may depend on how a court
defines police report. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Marion County Victim Advocate
Program, Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1362 (Ind. App. 1980). Gallagherconsidered whether
reports made at the scene of a crime or accident were official police records
open to public inspection. Id. at 1363. The court found that state law did not
require the detective to make this type of on-the-scene report. Id. at 1368. The
defendant Victim Advocate Program sought release of the victims' names contained in the detectives' reports. Id. at 1363. The Gallagher court, however,
reasoned that the reports were collected as an investigative aid, not in the discharge of a duty and, therefore, the detectives' reports were not official police
records available for public inspection. Id. at 1368. Accordingly, release of the
victims' names contained in the detectives' reports was denied. Id.
72. Usually ethical questions abound in privacy actions, however, none
were raised in Cox. See supra note 55 for a discussion of abuse of the press. Cox
condones an intrusion into the rape victim's privacy and, therefore, the decision
in "Cox is not held in high esteem." Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92
N.M. 170, 178, 584 P.2d 1310, 1318 (1978). Cox fails to appreciate the sensitive
nature of the intrusion into an individual's right of privacy when she is publicly
identified as a victim of a sexual assault. See Linder, supra note 30, at 430.
73. According to a recent Florida decision, Florida's statute which prohibits
publication of a rape victim's name is effective when the victim's name is not
yet available for public inspection. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television
Co., 436 So.2d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (1975)
(unlawful to publish information identifying the victim of a sexual offense). Cf,
Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762 (N.J. Super. 1982).
Information contained in hospital records are not open to public inspection pursuant to New Jersey state law. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8:43B, § 7.1(c)(3)(4)
(1981) (declares hospital records to be confidential).
74. The cases cited by Cox involved motor vehicle registration records and
similar public documentation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 193
F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1952) (patent on invention is a public record); Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 386 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1967) (motor vehicle registration), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
75. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 88 FRD 562, 563 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Documents can lose the protected status provided by a court order when
the documents become a part of the judicial proceeding. Id. at 564. An exhibit
not yet admitted into evidence, if used in arguments on a motion to dismiss,
becomes a part of the judicial proceeding and, thus, available to inspect and
copy. Id. at 565.
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76
equal access to public records.
From a practical standpoint, the likelihood that court records
can be readily located by someone who does not have knowledge of
a sexual assault is remote. 77 Moreover, it is questionable whether
any reasonable person not involved in news gathering or other research would desire to inspect and duplicate the record of a criminal trial.78 It is reasonable to assume that the public does not want
to know the name of the rape victim, and therefore the victim's desire to remain anonymous should outweigh the public's limited interest. Yet, according to Cox, it is the limitation of the public's
ability to observe the operations of the court proceeding that makes
79
the press responsible for informing the public.

Additionally, the Cox Court failed to specifically address
whether publication of a victim's name in a police report is newsworthy and, consequently, privileged under the first amendment.8 0
The Court implied, instead, that states should omit the rape victim's
76. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978) (public never had privileged access to Nixon tapes and, therefore, press was denied
access). However, the resources to obtain and/or disseminate information are
not available to the general public. See Passesand Trespasses, supra note 31, at
1313. The press gets preferred treatment over the public because the media has
the resources and means to discover and disseminate information concerning
public affairs. Id. See also United States ex reL Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Latimore v. Sielaff, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978).
In Latimore, spectators were excluded but the press was permitted to hear the
victim's testimony. Id. at 693. The court determined that it was protecting the
dignity of the rape victim by excluding spectators, but not the press. Id. at 694.
See also Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 865, 434 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1982)
(public, but not press, excluded from sexual assault victim's testimony).
77. Still, names and addresses contained in official court records are available for public inspection. Craig v. Municipal Ct., 100 Cal. App. 3d 69, 72, 161
Cal. Rptr. 19, 20 (1979). However, the Craig court demonstrated that names and
addresses contained in official police files held to be of public record did not
have to be released. Id. at 78-9, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 24. In Craig, at the request of
the criminal defendant, a police patrol was ordered to produce names and addresses of all persons arrested by the patrol for charges similar to the defendant's over a particular two year period. Id. at 72, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court
denied the disclosure fearing the persons whose names and addresses were released would be sought out by the defendant. Id. at 78, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
78. Even if a person is permitted to search the court records which are open
to the public, there is no guarantee that the first amendment will protect improper dissemination of the information. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139
Cal. App. 3d 118, 136, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 774 (1983) (disclosing plaintiff's
transsexuality was a malicious, actionable act at plaintiff's expense).
79. Cox holds in high esteem the press' judgment in its determinations of
what to publish and broadcast. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496 (1975). Contra Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So. 2d
328, 330-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (press must exercise more compassionate
discretion).
80. According to the court, this case presented the narrow question of
"whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the
name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more specifically, from judicial records . . . ." Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
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name in filing public records, thus permitting states to regulate certain information outside the public domain.8 1 Because Cox did not
require release of the rape victim's name prior to a judicial hearing,
it is within the state's power to protect a rape victim's name at the
time the crime is reported.
In many cases the victim's name is obtained from a police file
rather than an official court record.82 In each instance, however,
when the police promised to keep the victim's identity confidential,
the assurances proved ineffective.8 3 Since Cox, state courts have, in
effect, held that a rape victim has no protectable privacy right in
her name after it has been reported in a police record.8 4 The reasoning of the courts is that because police files are public records,
information contained therein is presumed newsworthy.
Even if the press guarantees the rape victim that it will not
publish her name, such a promise does not waive the media's consti81. Id. at 495-96. "If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial
proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation..
" Id. at 496.
82. In Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760 (N.J. Super.
1982), it was not clear that the rape victim's name was obtained from a police
record rather than derived from a hospital source. The court, therefore, felt
compelled to apply a more definitive test of newsworthiness rather than rely on
the uncertainty of whether the source-based privilege, under Cox, came into
play. Id. at 1761.
83. See, e.g., Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 531, 561 P.2d 998, 1002
(1977). In Ayers, the promise from police to conceal the rape victim's identity
was not actionable. Id. The Ayers court, however, conceded that the rape victim was justifiably distressed at the disclosure of her name in light of the unkept promise. Id. In addition to unkept promises from the police, promises
from the media are not legally binding. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92
N.M. 170, 172, 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1978). Moreover, promises made by state
prosecutors to conceal the victim's identity are not enforceable. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
84. See, e.g., Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 532, 561 P.2d 998, 1000
(1977) (name contained in police file was available for public inspection and,
therefore, not actionable under an invasion of privacy claim). Yet, under a negligence theory, a crime victim has an actionable right for publicity given to her
name after it has been reported in a police record. Hyde v. City of Columbia,
637 S.W.2d 251, 273 (Mo. App. 1982) (publication of a witness-victim's name
while her assailant was still at large rose to the level of negligence on part of
newspaper that revealed victim's name), cert. denied sub nom. Tribune Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). See Office of the Attorney General of
California, No. 83-906, slip op. (Oct. 11, 1984) (available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS,
All A.G. file) (courts must protect a citizen's security, particularly if the citizen
is the only witness to a murder case). But see Hood v. Naeter Bros. Publishing
Co., 562 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. App. 1978). The Hood court stated that it was unwise,
but not unlawful, for a newspaper to publish the name and address of a sole
witness to a violent crime while the criminals were still at large. Id. at 772. The
plaintiff in Hood sought recovery on a theory of outrageous conduct causing
mental distress. Id. at 770. The court concluded that the publication of the witness' name did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at
771-72.
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tutional privilege to print what is contained in public records. 85 In
Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc.,86 for instance, a 14-year-old
sexual assault victim's name was published in a newspaper after the
87
reporter promised that he would not reveal the child's identity.
8
8
The parents sued the newspaper for an invasion of privacy. The
Poteet court read into the Cox opinion the premise that as long as
the victim's name could have been located in a public record, the
89
name was available for publication.
The parents contended that the newspaper had waived its right
to publish what was publicly documented. The court found that the
reporter did not have the newspaper's authority to promise not to
publish the child's name. 90 Thus, there was no waiver of the privilege to report information of public record. 91 Poteet reflects the
majority view that the media is not obligated to maintain the victim's anonymity, notwithstanding its express promise to do so. 92
85. A promise not to print a victim's name is insufficient to constitute a
waiver of the privilege to print matters of public record without raising the additional requirement of the reporter's authority to speak for the defendant
newspaper. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 172, 584 P.2d
1310, 1312 (1978).
86. Id. at 170, 584 P.2d at 1310.
87. Id. For a discussion on moral obligations that are not legally binding see
supra note 83.
88. Poteet, 92 N.M. at 171, 584 P.2d at 1311.
89. Id. at 711-12, 584 P.2d at 1311-12. Even though a fact was not actually
obtained from a public record, it is sufficient that the fact could have been obtained from a public record. See Anonymous v. Dun & Bradstreet, 3 Med. L.
Rptr. 2376, 2376 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (facts expunged from public record could be
obtained from newspaper clipping, however, not certain that facts were taken
off newspaper story). But see Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d
118, 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (1983) (there was no proof that the reporter
learned the plaintiff's true gender from a birth certificate which is of public
record and, therefore, the court concluded the information was not in the public
domain and available for publication).
90. Poteet, however, does not foreclose the possibility of a waiver of the
right to publish a rape victim's name, when the proper authority authorizes it.
92 N.M. at 173, 584 P.2d at 1313. Poteet does not address how the victim knows
whether the reporter is the proper agent of the newspaper. Id.
91. In contrast to the waiver of a first amendment right alleged by the rape
victim in Poteet, 92 N.M. at 171, 584 P.2d at 1311, the assertion of a waiver in a
privacy action is usually raised by the defendant newspaper who alleges that
the complainant has waived a right of privacy by injecting himself into the public eye. See Taylor v. KTVB, Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 207, 525 P.2d 984, 989 (1974)
(Shepard, C.J., dissenting) (privacy right waived due to criminal behavior; displaying himself in nude while committing criminal act). See also Werner v.
Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961); Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956); Cohen v.
Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949).
92. Since the reporter's promise to maintain the child rape victim's name
was unenforceable in Poteet, the child's family raised an alternative allegation
that they had relied on the newspaper's policy to withhold printing a rape victim's name and, therefore, the newspaper was estopped from raising a newsworthiness defense. Poteet, 92 N.M. at 172, 584 P.2d at 1312 (court held there
was no proof that plaintiffs had knowledge of policy not to print victim's name).
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Because the rape victim cannot rely on the discretion of the
police or the press to conceal her identity, a possible solution rests
in the legislature's ability to enact a statute that would secure a victim's anonymity at the time she reports the rape. 93 States do have
laws that classify certain police information as confidential; however, many state statutes are poorly drafted and are vague regarding what information in a police file may be kept confidential. 94
For example, the Missouri Supreme Court in Hyde v. City of Columbia 95 confronted the question whether, under a state statute, a
victim's name contained in an investigative police file should be
considered confidential, even though the police arrest reports were
open to public inspection. 96
In Hyde, a woman reported to the police that she had been abducted at gunpoint. 97 The crime was reported on an official criminal investigation form.98 A local newspaper printed the story based
on the facts alleged in the police record. 99 After printing the victim's identity in the paper, the assailant, while still at large, repeatedly harrassed her. 1°° The court held that the disclosure of the
93. See Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So.2d 328 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (states can provide protection to privacy rights of citizens
prior to open judicial proceedings).
94. See, e.g., Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 262-63 (Mo. App.
1982) (Hyde court interpreted Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010 to 610.120 (Vernon
1982), to exclude from public, crime victim's name and address taken down in a
criminal investigation form, whereas a record of arrest is open to public inspection). See also Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Open Records Dec., No.
339, slip op. (Dec. 31, 1982) (available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS, All A.G. file). The
Attorney General in Texas refused to make available to the press a police record containing the name of a sexual assault victim. Id. Texas law permits the
front page of the police record to be made public and the victim's name was on
the front page of the police report. The Attorney General, however, held that
there was a constitutional right to obtain information from a police record. Id.
However, the Supreme Court has never recognized such a right. Id. Accordingly, the Attorney General refused release of the information based on a common law right of privacy, rather than a constitutional right, to protect the rape
victim from such a highly intimate disclosure. Id.
95. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied sub noa. Tribune Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
96. Id. See also State v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 225 Kan. 540, 592
P.2d 891 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3827 (1975). In Stauffer, the court struck
down a statute that permitted only courthouse reporters access to information
contained in police warrants for arrest. Id. at 547-48, 592 P.2d at 896. The statute was unconstitutional because it gave special privileges to courthouse reporters over rights of access to all reporters. Id. at 548, 592 P.2d at 897.
97. The Hyde court believed the abduction was for sexual purposes even
though the assailant did not assault or try to molest her. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W. 251, 254 n.2 (Mo. App. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Tribune Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
98. Id. at 263.
99. Id. at 253.
100. On one occasion, the victim received a phone call from her assailant in
which the man said, "I'm glad you're not dead yet, I have plans for you before
you die." Id. at 254-55 n.2.
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victim's name placed her in a "clear and present" danger. 10 1 The
Hyde court concluded that the press' right to publish a story is qual10 2
ified by an accompanying duty to protect a citizen's security.
The Hyde court's limitation on the right to publish a crime victim's name derived from its construction of a state statute that did
not clearly permit disclosure of facts obtained from a police investigation file. 10 3 In construing the statute, the court accorded great
significance to protecting an individual from danger. 10 4 The court
101. The injury alleged in Hyde's cause of action for negligence was mental
anguish and nervous and physical shock as a result of exposure to clear and
present danger. Id. at 272-73. To compare the injury suffered in a negligence
action for publication given to a victim's name and a privacy action for publication given to a victim's name see Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d
1296, 1299-1300 (4th Cir. 1983) (emotional distress and embarrassment are required to show the publication was offensive to a reasonable person); Hubbard
v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 474, 368 P.2d 147, 148 (1962) (rape victim
alleged that printing her name caused humiliation, mental distress, and ruined
her future prospects for marriage). Compared to a privacy action which requires that the publication be offensive to a reasonable person, there is an
emerging tort called breach of confidence that allows even the hypersensitive to
recover for an unwarranted publication. See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,
83 Idaho 578, 587-88, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (private disclosure of complainant's
finances was not an invasion of privacy but there was tort liability for breach of
confidential relation). See generally Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging
Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982) (breach of confidence protects distinct interests present in a confidential relationship that would otherwise go unprotected under a cause of action for invasion of privacy).
102. One of the elements satisfied in Hyde's negligence cause of action for
publication of a crime victim's name was the duty owed to foresee the likelihood
of injury. The breach of duty occurred because the newspaper failed to protect
the crime victim from her assailant. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251,
257 (Mo. App. 1982). The negligence theory used by the plaintiff in Hyde is one
of the three principal tort theories that have been used in actions against the
press for publicity given to a private fact. Id. at 265-67. In addition to negligence and privacy, the third tort theory is defamation. Id. at 254. In Hyde, a
court, for the first time, allowed a plaintiff to prevail on a negligence theory
against the media for its accurate reporting of a crime victim's name that was of
public record. Id. at 273. See generally Linder, supra note 30. The element of
causation was also satisfied in Hyde, since the court found the publication
caused the crime victim to be put in clear and present danger. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d
at 271-72.
103. See supra note 94.
104. "To construe the Sunshine Law to open all criminal investigation information to anyone with a request subserves neither the public safety policy of
our state nor the personal security of a victim ...." Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 263.
(It is the police's self-imposed rule in Columbia, Missouri to conceal a crime
victim's name prior to the criminal's arrest). Generally, courts construe a statute to conform to the court's predisposed position on an issue. See, e.g., Office of
the Attorney General of California, No. 83-906, slip op. (Oct. 11, 1984) (available
July 1, 1985, on LEXIS, All A.G. file) (court found social utility in exposing
names in newspaper of absent parents wanted on a charge of child support and,
thus, construed the ambiguity in the statute to include publication of names of
persons sought under warrants of arrest, even though access to this information

was restricted to authorized agencies); Office of the Attorney General of Texas,
Open Records Dec., No. 422, slip op. (July 26, 1984) (available July 1, 1985, on
LEXIS, All A.G. file) (because attempted suicide is a matter of privacy, court
choose to construe state statute as exempting details of a suicide attempt con-
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emphasized that construing the police report to be within the public
domain would render hazardous results, particularly when the ab10 5
ductor was still at large.
Hyde demonstrates that courts retain the capacity, without undermining Cox, to advance state interests when the victim's personal safety outweighs freedom of the press. According to the Hyde
court, the Missouri statute established when the press and public
have a right to inspect police files. Statutory interpretation in favor
of the crime victim is one method of protecting public disclosure of
the victim's identity. 10 6 According to the Hyde court, the press does
not have a constitutional right to publish information contained in
10 7
police files that are not of public record.
Given the limited means of applying a workable statutory construction, however, an alternative means is for the legislature to unequivocally classify, as confidential information, a crime victim's
name contained in a police record.' 08 For rape victims who wish to
remain anonymous, this legislative protection may provide an incentive to report the crime. Yet, keeping the rape victim's name
confidential in a police report does not extend the necessary protection to the rape victim who also wishes to remain anonymous at the
rape trial.10 9
tained in a police report from public domain, even though ordinary meaning of

statute permits disclosure of a crime victim's name).
105. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 269.
106. On the other hand, statutory construction in favor of the press is one
means of restricting a victim's right of privacy. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982), it was not certain that the
state statute which denied the press access to hear a child rape victim's testimony either encouraged the child to testify or improved the quality of the testimony, as was the state's asserted purpose. Id. The Globe Court held that it was
too speculative to say that the rape victim would not have come forward and
testified except for the statute that restrained the media's presence in the courtroom. Id. at 609.
107. Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 269-70 n. 25 (discusses Cox).
108. See, e.g., Houston Chronical Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531
S.W.2d 177, 186-87 (Tex. 1975) (only information required to be disclosed is that
which appears on front page of offense report). The statute must be narrowly
tailored to serve the state purpose or it may be struck down as unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 110 (1979). In Smith,
the West Virginia statute, W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976), made it a misdemeanor
for a newspaperto publish the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender
without a written order from the court. Id. at 98. The Smith Court held that
any effective ban on publication must apply equally to all forms of communication, otherwise a statute restraining just one form of communication does not
achieve the statute's purpose. Id. at 110.
109. Exposing a child rape victim to a judicial proceeding may be only the
beginning of the child's and family's loss of anonymity. Poteet v. Roswell Daily
Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 174, 584 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1978) (a tragic event such as a
rape can be indelibly printed in law reporters, law books, and law review articles for years to come).
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Many rape victims refrain from taking their attackers to court
because they fear public scrutiny and criticism. For this reason
alone, trial courts should take precautions to shield disclosure of
the victim's name during any trial or hearing.11 0 A court, at its discretion, has the right to use initials or pseudonyms' in place of the
victim's name when the potentially harmful psychological consequences to the victim outweigh the defendant's sixth amendment
right to a public trial." 2 Even though most courts concede that use
of a pseudonym does not implicate the defendant's sixth amendment rights, 1 3 the use of a pseudonym is not an established practice in criminal cases but, rather, is often restricted to civil
litigation."l 4 The courts, however, have the power to adopt a
mandatory rule of procedure which informs the rape victim that, at
her request, she has the absolute right to be referred to by a pseudonym. 15 Such a rule would maintain the victim's anonymity without affecting the press' right to publish any information contained
in the court record.
A pseudonym, however, cannot guarantee adequate personal
privacy protection when television cameras are permitted in the
110. In instances of serious sexual assaults, in order to shield the victim,
courts sometimes refer to her only by initials. King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486, 488
n.3 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928 (1982).
111. Juvenile delinquency cases are often identified by initials. In re Welfare of K, 269 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. 1978); In re L., 24 Or. App. 257, 546 P.2d 153
(1976). See Note, Anonymity in Civil Litigation: The "Doe" Plaintiff,57 NoThE DAME LAw. 580, 582 (1982) (discusses procedural and substantive hurdles to
justify using a pseudonym).
112. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ..
" U.S. CONST.
amend VI. The sixth amendment's guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit
of the defendant alone. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979).
The Constitution does not mention right of access to a criminal trial on the part
of the public. Id. at 379. Therefore, the history of the sixth amendment's public
trial guarantee demonstrates no more than the existence of a common-law rule
of open criminal proceedings, not a constitutional right of the public to attend a
criminal trial. Id. at 385.
113. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 176, 584 P.2d 1310,
1316 (1978). See also United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Latimore v. Sielaff, 435 U.S. 1076 (1978)
(mitigation of the rape ordeal is a justifiable concern of a trial court).
114. See supra note 111.
115. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 176, 584 P.2d 1310,
1316 (1978) (state supreme courts have absolute power to adopt rules that shield
name of child rape victims during any trial or hearing). Any restriction on who
may attend a criminal proceeding is more likely to infringe on the defendant's
sixth amendment right than exercising the right to use a pseudonym in place of
the rape victim's name. See, Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 89-90 (1977) (the basic presumption in favor of openess at trial is partly based on encouraging greater testimonial veracity).
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courtroom.1 1 6 In Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton lorida Television
Co.,117 for instance, Jane Doe sought recovery from a television sta-

tion that broadcast a videotape of her testimony at a rape trial
which identified her by name.118 The Doe court held that, under
Cox,the television station was privileged to give further publicity to
information learned in the courtroom. 119 Moreover, the television
station was permitted to film the trial proceeding in accordance
120
with Florida law.
Because the presence of television cameras at a rape trial is discretionary, 12 1 the Doe court emphasized the trial court's gross lack
of consideration for the Doe victim and her family in light of the
lasting and devastating effect of the broadcast. 122 Furthermore, because a transcript of the rape trial was available for publication, the
116. The presence of television cameras makes a rape trial a spectator's
sport. When News Becomes Voyeurism: Live Cable Coverage of Rape Trial Redefines Journalism,TIME, March 26, 1984, at 64.

117. 436 So.2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
118. While the videotape ran on the evening newscast, the newscaster identified the rape victim by name. Id. at 329 (the state prosecutors made no effort to
ensure that rape victim's name and picture remained closed to public).
119. Id. at 329-30.
120. In 1981 the Supreme Court upheld a Florida law that permitted television coverage of judicial proceedings. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582-83
(1981). Thirty seven states permit electronic coverage in the courtroom.
DEVAL, MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT, THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN

YEARS, 419 (1982). For a further discussion of electronic media in the courtroom see supra notes 50 & 51.
121. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc. 370 So.2d 764, 782 (Fla. 1979)
(exclusion of the electronic media is left to the sound discretion of the judge).
122. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 331 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("[w]e take this opportunity to encourage the use of compassionate discretion."). See State v. Williams, 7 Med. L. Rptr. 1849 (Ga. 1981).
The Williams court stated that it was up to the trial court to determine
whether a television station can televise all or part of a trial. Id. at 1851. Any
determination must consider the adverse effect on victims of the accused or
their relatives who view the testimony. Id. The Williams court denied the
defendant's request to televise the hearing because of potential psychological
harm to the murder victims' families. Id. at 1852.
The courtroom judge must consider 1) any adverse effect on trial participants, 2) the likelihood of attorney theatrics, 3) diverting concentration of jury
members, 4) focus on the sensational rather than the significant, and 5) loss of
dignity in the courtroom. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d
764, 775 (Fla. 1979). Further consideration is given to 1) the public's right to
know, 2) promoting the sixth amendment concept of a public trial, 3) educational value, 4) and the notion that the presence of television cameras serves the
same purpose as reporters and sketch artists. Id. at 779-80.
A case arose in Arizona that involved a judge's order to restrain a television
station's sketch artist's drawings of jurors' reactions and behavior. KPNX
Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Ct., 139 Ariz. 246, 248, 678 P.2d 431, 433 (1984). The
KPNX court held that the restraint order was an unconstitutional infringement
on the media's first amendment right to attend and report on criminal trials.
Id. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444. Under Cox, the sketches of jurors were as much in
the public domain as the rape victim's name in Cox. Id. at 250-51, 678 P.2d at
437-38.
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press' constitutional right of access to the public trial would not
have been infringed by not permitting camera coverage. 123 Therefore, the Doe court admonished state prosecutors who failed to seek
124
a protective order to restrict videotaping the victim's testimony.
Restricting camera coverage alone is not sufficient to protect
the rape victim's right of privacy. 125 Pseudonyms, although not affording absolute protection, greatly enhance the anonymity of the
victim. Unless a pseudonym is used, a transcript of the rape trial
will reveal the victim's identity, regardless of camera coverage.
Consequently, the judiciary must take measures to use a pseudonym and restrict telecasting the victim's testimony in order to
shield her identity.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY LIMITED TO MATTERS NOT OF PUBLIC RECORD

The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
whether an accurate publication of a rape victim's name is newsworthy where it is not of public record. 126 This issue was addressed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Griffith v. Rancocas Valley
Hospital.127 The court assessed the newsworthiness of publishing a
sexual assault victim's name derived from confidential medical
records. 128 The hospital, without the victim's consent, released in123. See In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D.
Minn. 1980) (court limited press access to transcript of videotapes that revealed
the multiple rape of the victim while she lay blindfolded and bound on the
floor).
124. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
125. See Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 178, 584 P.2d 1310,
1318 (Fla. 1978).
126. Courts and scholars define the newsworthy value given to a private fact
with varying results. See Gilbert v. Medical Economics, Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308
(10th Cir. 1981) (facts that educate, enlighten or amuse are newsworthy); Taylor v. KTVB, Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 206, 525 P.2d 984, 988 (1974) (not newsworthy if
used for purpose of embarrassment); Rawlins v. Hutchinson, 218 Kan. 295, 305,
543 P.2d 988, 996 (1975) (every person has episodes in their lives that should
remain confidential); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 269 (Mo. App.
1982) (crime victim's name is a trivial public concern), cert. denied sub nom.
Tribune Publishing Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Barber v. Time, Inc., 345
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) (story may be news, but identity of plaintiff
adds little to the story); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 178,
584 P.2d 1310, 1318 (1978) (name and address of child rape victim has no news
value for public consumption); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(g)
(1977) (arrests, raids, suicides, marriages, divorces, accidents, fires, and catastrophes of nature are news). News is what is of interest, not what ought to be of
interest. See Franklin, supra note 21, at 115.
127. 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760 (N.J. Super. 1982).
128. Id. at 1762. See Jordan v. Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., 314 So. 2d 222
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In Jordan, plaintiffs as adoptive parents, sued the
newspaper for publishing a story about their adoption, relying upon a statute
that made adoption records confidential. Id. at 223. The plaintiffs contended
that the statute created a right to privacy to conceal the adoptive parents' and
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formation regarding the sexual assault. 129 A newspaper printed the
story and identified the victim by name and address. 130 The Griffith court observed that, under New Jersey law, hospital records
are classified as confidential and require written patient consent as
a prerequisite to their release. 131 The Griffith court found that the
hospital's disclosure was not protected by a source-based privilege. 1 32 The court concluded, however, that the newspaper's disclosure was protected under the first amendment because the victim's
name was substantially relevant to the story.1 33 This relevancy
standard of newsworthiness was based on the logical nexus
34
theory.
The Griffith court decided that the Cox source-based privilege
did not appropriately address the newsworthy value of the publicity
given to the rape victim's name because her identity was first
learned from a non-public source. 135 According to the court, the
proper standard to be applied was the logical nexus test. 3 6 The
court found that the victim's name was substantially relevant in
child's anonymity. Id. Since there was no proof that the newspaper obtained
the names from the confidential records, the privacy action was dismissed. Id.
at 224.
129. Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760 (N.J. Super.
1982). Permission from the plaintiff to disclose the private fact can control a
court's decision-making. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975)
(a magazine has no right to publish unnewsworthy, embarrassing facts taken
down during an interview where the person interviewed subsequently withdraws permission to print the facts), cet denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
130. Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760 (N.J. Super.
1982).
131. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8:43B, § 7.1(c)(3)(4) (1981). See Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Open Records Dec. No. 370, slip op. (April 15, 1983)
(available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS, All A.G. file) (information contained in medical reports might raise a claim of privacy if it relates to a drug overdose, acute
alcohol intoxication, obstetrical/gynecological illness, convulsions/seizures, or
emotional/mental distress).
132. Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762 (N.J.
Super. 1982). Griffith answers the issue not confronted by Cox, that liability
may attach for releasing a victim's name not in the public domain. Id.
133. Id. For further discussion on the substantial relevancy test, also referred to as the local nexus theory, see supra notes 40 & 42 and accompanying
text.
134. Id.
135. In the course of gathering news, the reporter is not restricted to official
sources of information, but may base a story on any available source, if lawfully
obtained. Id. at 1761. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99,
103 (1979) (newspaper reporter obtained juvenile offender's name by monitoring police radio and questioning witnesses; all in accordance with routine reporting practices); Taylor v. KTVB, Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 207, 525 P.2d 984, 989
(1974) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting) (media acted in accordance with routine reporting practices when arrest of nude man was filed).
136. Griffith v. Rancocas Valley Hosp., 8 Med. L. Rptr. 1760, 1762 (N.J.
Super. 1982) (to properly balance freedom of the press against the right of privacy, the published fact must have some substantial relevance to a matter of
public concern).
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that it added credibility to the story recounting the sexual attack
and, therefore, was newsworthy. 137 The logical nexus approach,
even more than the Cox source-based privilege, places little significance on the rape victim's right of privacy and the hazardous consequences that result from publication of her identity. The Griffith
court could have reached a different conclusion had a stricter standard of newsworthiness, the three-part test, been applied.
Although the three-part newsworthiness test has not been applied with respect to a rape victim's name, a clear example of its
applicability to privacy cases involving identity can be found in Diaz
v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.138 In Diaz, the California Court of Appeals concluded that disclosing the true identity of the complainant
was not newsworthy. A newspaper reporter had learned that the
student body president of a college was a transsexual. 139 The news140
paper revealed that the female president was formerly a man.
The newspaper contended that because there was a birth certificate
on public record which carried the plaintiff's original name and
gender, the publication was protected under Cox.' 41 There was no
proof, however, that the reporter relied on the birth certificate to
learn the plaintiff's name and, thus, the Diaz court determined that
the fact of the complainant's original gender was not a matter of
public record. 14
The newspaper additionally argued that the plaintiff's questionable gender identity was newsworthy because it was a contemporary social issue. The Diaz court examined the social utility of
disclosing the claimant's original identity in the context of the
three-part newsworthiness test.143 The court found that the plaintiff made strong efforts to conceal her original identity,'" and that
137. Contra Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 178, 584 P.2d
1310, 1318 (1978) (rape victim's name is not news); Deaton v. Delta Democrat
Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (names relating to issues of an
embarrassing or sensitive nature should not be published without consent).
138. 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
139. The reporter did not reveal his sources. Id. at 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
140. The publication, in part, said that "[t]he students at the college ... will
be surprised to learn their student body president ... is no lady, but is in fact a
man .... " Id. at 124, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
141. The police records upon which the reporter relied did not contain information concerning Diaz's new name or gender. Id. at 132, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
("[w]e also do not consider Diaz's ... birth certificate to be a public record in
this instance.").
142. Id. Other courts presume a source-based privilege when a fact may
have been derived from a public source. For further discussion see supra note
89.
143. For the required elements of the three-part newsworthiness test see
supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
144. Even though the plaintiff was part of a small political arena at college,
the Diaz court felt it was adequately contained and, thus, did not amount to a
voluntary entry into the public eye. Id. at 134, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73. Cf.Bi-
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the publication unnecessarily intruded into her right of privacy
under the pretense that the article was meant to benefit a legitimate social concern. 145 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
right of privacy outweighed the public's right to know, and therefore the publication was not considered newsworthy. 146 The Diaz
rationale is even more compelling where the identity of a rape victim is involved. First, as in Diaz, there is no social utility in revealing the claimant's identity, particularly where stigmatizing
social attitudes against the rape victim may result. Second, as in
Diaz, the nature of the intrusion into the victim's private life is
clearly offensive where efforts to preserve anonymity are disregarded for the mere sake of sensational highlighting of the underlying story. Third, however, a negative answer as to the degree to
which the complainant voluntarily entered the public eye is much
more appropriate for a rape victim than a transsexual.
In comparison, had the logical nexus test been applied in Diaz,
an invasion of privacy would not have been found because, as was
argued, the disclosure that the plaintiff was born a man could add
credibility to a story about the first female student body president
of a college.1 47 By contrast, in Griffith, it was not "logical" that a
citizen should lose her right to privacy because she had the misfortune to become a victim of a sexual assault. 148 Griffith reflects the
Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (public figures whose names are already in public domain have waived the right to
privacy claim for publicity given to a private fact). One scholar maintains that
the greater the area of dissemination given to a private fact, the less newsworthy the name and the less harmful the publication because fewer of the
persons who read the story are likely to know the particular plaintiff and, thus,
gossip and rumor are not significant concerns. See also Franklin, supra note 21,
at 119. Contra Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television, Co., 436 So. 2d 328,
331-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (as the size of the community in which the
broadcast occurs increases, the deeper the intrusion into the plaintiff's private
life).
145. The Diaz court found the reporter's conscious disregard for the plaintiff's right of privacy to be malicious and callous, and although malice is not an
element of a privacy action, the finding of malice influenced the court's decision-making. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 135-36, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
146. Although the Diaz court strongly emphasized that the plaintiff prevailed on the merits of the case, the trial court was reversed on other grounds
because of errors in the jury instructions. Id. at 122, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
147. The newspaper raised a newsworthiness defense based on the theory
that plaintiff's former gender negatived her title as first female student body
president. Id. at 133, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
148. One case involving disclosure of a rape victim's name treated the victim's presence at the rape trial as entering the public eye and, thus, a contributing factor to the media's newsworthiness defense. Hubbard v. Journal
Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 475, 368 P.2d 147, 148-49 (1962) (participants in trial
proceedings, even if unwilling, lose part of their right of privacy). Cf. Campbell
v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (the freedom of press is a
privilege that often outweighs the privacy rights of persons who do not voluntarily seek publicity).
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harsh result that the logical nexus approach renders, whereas the
three-part Diaz approach recognizes a privacy action for the insensitive publication of intimate information. In light of the consequences of the different approaches taken by the Griffith and Diaz
courts for determining whether a published matter is newsworthy,
the three-part test used in Diaz would clearly afford greater protection of the rape victim's right to anonymity.
The Diaz three-part test offers a proper balancing of freedom
of the press and the right to privacy because it ultimately considers
the social utility of the published fact. 149 Courts generally agree
that there is no social value in revealing a rape victim's identity because it does not add to, and is not essential to, the rape story.
Moreover, courts acknowledge that publication may cause the pubi
lic to scrutinize and criticize the rape victim.1
0 Under this rationale, the rape victim's name is not considered newsworthy, while the
need to protect the victim from psychological harm is regarded as
paramount. 1 5 1 Therefore, the three-part newsworthiness test can
protect the rape victim's right to privacy. By contrast, the logical
nexus standard cannot shield the identity of a rape victim whose
name is derived from a confidential source because the standard
merely requires that the name relate to the rape. If the Cox sourcebased privilege must stand, then a tougher standard must be applied
when information is derived from a non-public source.
CONCLUSION

The most literal interpretation of Cox rests in its call to the
states to keep the rape victim's name off the public records. If the
legislature and judiciary hasten to meet this call, then Cox need not
be an inadequate standard of protection of privacy rights. States
must enact statutes that classify as confidential those portions of
police records that contain the rape victim's name and address.
Upon the plaintiff's request, courts should have a mandatory rule of
procedure in which a pseudonym could be used in place of the rape
victim's actual name. Moreover, courts should restrict electronic
coverage of the rape victim's testimony.
149. The Diaz court found little guidance in Cox because of its narrow holding. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 131-32, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771. See also Roshto v.
Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430-31 (La. 1983) (Cox failed to question whether truthful publications are always newsworthy and, therefore, privileged under the
first amendment).
150. In re Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 41, 428 A.2d
126, 139 (1981).
151. The rape victim in the recent telecast of the New Bedford Rape Case,
see supra note 3, moved to a new state because she was humilated during her
rape trial which turned into a public spectacle. Rape: TV Replay (Broadcastof
New Bedford Rape Trial), NATION, April 7, 1984, at 403.
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Unlike victims of other crimes, there is a social stigma attached

to a victim of a sexual assault. 152 There must be some point at
which the constitutional right to publish must bow to the dignity of
the rape victim, particularly when her name is not of public record.
Disclosure of the victim's name exposes her to possible humiliation
and degradation. Publication of the rape victim's identity serves no
legitimate purpose but, rather, caters to a "morbid desire" to con153
nect the details of a "detestable" crime with a victim's name.
Under the logical nexus theory of newsworthiness, the mere connection of the name to the crime justifies the publication. Therefore, courts must adopt the three-part newsworthiness test when a
rape victim's right of privacy is implicated and Cox is not
controlling.
Ellen B. Fishbein

152. Broadcasting a rape victim's name in relation to a rape case perpetuates
the myth that the woman "asked for it." In re Matter of Pittsburgh Action
Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 40, 428 A.2d 126, 139 (1981). The rape victim's situation is unique. Id. at 41-42, 428 A.2d at 139. Unlike the victim of robbery or any
other non-rape victim, there is the social stigma of being a victim. Id. at 40, 428
A.2d at 139. "Rare is the woman who can endure both the trauma of rape and
the trauma of a highly publicized trial." Randolph, Tavern Rape Case Prompts
HearingInto How To Make Trials, Washington Post, April 25, 1984, at A3.
153. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 161, 33 N.W.2d 305, 312 (1984).

